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AbstrAct 
This paper discusses culture as a unit of analysis within social science inquiry, and its more systematic treatment as a 
dynamic, idiosyncratic model for human development; one whose logical arrangement of interpretative “deep structural” 
cosmological and ontological axioms of existence for collective organization and functioning configures the scope and nature 
of overt social behaviors and praxes (including symbols, language, customs) and informs a general plan for living that guides 
individual behavior and group praxes. This behavioral approach allows for a richer elaboration of culture by clarifying its 
cosmological, ontological, and psychological foundations and influences on its nature and role in the formation, organization 
and functioning of human aggregates. In addition, it offers an examination of the theoretical implications for social stability 
of antithetical deep structural axioms that fragments an erstwhile teleological social existence into an assortment of disjoin-
ted cultural symbols and rituals ripe for commodification. And, through it, the contemporary phenomenon of globalization 
-- and the neoclassical economic paradigm that grounds it -- is found to engender an idiosyncratic, market-based model of 
reality and for living that is neither a commonly shared human conceptualization nor universally desired pursuit. 
Key words: culture, cultural studies, African studies, traditional African culture, African praxes
La ciencia de la cultura: implicaciones para las investigaciones de las Ciencias Sociales 
en el fenómeno africano contemporáneo
resumen
Este artículo discute la cultura como una unidad de análisis dentro de la investigación en las ciencias sociales y su tratamiento 
más sistemático como un modelo dinámico e idiosincrático para el desarrollo humano, modelo cuya disposición lógica de axiomas 
interpretativos de “estructuras profundas” cosmológicas y ontológicas (axiomas de existencia para la organización colectiva y 
su funcionamiento) configura el objetivo y la naturaleza de conductas y praxis sociales abiertas (incluyendo símbolos, lengua, 
costumbres) e informa un plan general de vida que guía el comportamiento individual y las prácticas colectivas. Este enfoque 
conductista permite una rica elaboración de la cultura aclarando sus fundamentos cosmológicos, ontológicos y psicológicos, y 
las influencias en su naturaleza y papel en la formación, organización y funcionamiento de conglomerados humanos. Además, 
ofrece un examen de las implicaciones teóricas para la estabilidad social en axiomas antitéticos de estructura profunda, los cuales 
fragmentan una previa existencia social teleológica dentro de un arreglo de símbolos y rituales sociales fragmentarios lista para 
la cosificación. Y, a través de ello, se propone cómo el fenómeno contemporáneo de la globalización –y el paradigma económico 
neoclásico que lo sustenta—engendra un modelo de la realidad y del vivir idiosincrático basado en lo económico, modelo que no 
es ni una conceptualización humana comúnmente compartida, ni un objetivo universal deseado. 
Palabras clave: la cultura, los estudios culturales, estudios africanos, praxis africanos
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“[I]t seems that we are at last coming to the 
realization that without some account of 
the normative principles, some fundamental 
consideration of value norms and ultimates, 
no philosophical system can hope to diffe-
rentiate itself from descriptive science or 
present a functional, interpretative version 
of human experience.” -- Alain Locke, Value 
and Imperative
Introduction
The world has become infinitesimally 
small. Widespread changes in industrial-
era political and economic relations-
hips have deepened a global exigency 
for societal stability through economic 
restructuring and democratic reforms. 
However, such post-industrial strate-
gies have increasingly heightened social 
volatility within increasingly porous 
national boundaries and the endemial 
ethnic and religious communities that 
they circumscribe. The frequency and 
intensity of conflicts over, competing 
perspectives on governance and civic 
engagement, on approaches to processes 
of democratization, and on allocations 
of scarce socioeconomic resources want 
for a more systematic understanding of 
the relationship between culture, society 
and its institutions. 
Broadly defined, culture, as the basis 
for human aggregation, encompasses 
the totality of learned values, norms, 
knowledge, artifacts, language and sym-
bols that are constantly communicated 
among an aggregate of people who share 
a common way of life. It shapes and 
structures the individual and aggregate 
patterns of interaction that predicate the 
overall organization and functioning of 
a human aggregation, otherwise termed 
a society. The meaning of culture ranges 
from an idealist perspective emphasizing 
a noumenal “spirit” informing distinct 
ways of life, to a materialist perspective 
that is distinctively discernible social 
processes (Williams, 1982). Similarly, the 
sense of culture as the active cultivation 
of the mind ranges from a “developed” 
state of mind, to processes of intellec-
tual development and the means for 
such processes (e.g., the arts). Griswold 
(1994) notes that this understanding of 
the meaning and sense of culture re-
sults from an 18th century humanities 
approach that privileges an opposition 
between culture and civilization, and a 
19th century social science behavioralist 
approach that emphasizes a harmony 
between culture and civilization.
 
It is through this obsolete 19th century 
theoretical framework that social science 
attempts to understand contemporary 
social problems and their root in an irre-
gular array of accumulated and organized 
symbols that function to influence both 
individual and group behaviors.  This 
behavioralist approach places signifi-
cance on the usefulness of symbols and 
their embedded meanings that shape and 
influence behavioral patterns to indicate 
change and stability in group behavior. 
Historical group interaction and change 
endow symbols with “meanings,” which 
are social to the extent that they confi-
gure patterns of interaction and reflect 
collectively shared representations that 
can be organized on the basis of the va-
rious social forms that they embody. The 
various social forms that “meanings” can 
come to embody include values, norms, 
knowledge, artifacts, and language, all of 
which are regarded as elements of cultu-
re. Thus, it is through its various social 
forms that culture imposes historically 
accumulated and rationally ordered 
meaning upon discrete experiences of 
living, and establishes a constant orien-
tation within a context of temporally 
sequenced, yet geographically diverse 
social environments.1 
The fact that culture does exist and is 
associated with behavior, identity and 
group interaction validates the useful-
ness of symbols and their embedded 
meanings to signify change and sta-
bility. However, the problem with the 
behavioralist approach is its inability 
to move our understanding of culture’s 
significance to society across so broad 
a range of group functions unfettered 
by its narrow focus on ordering beha-
vior by degree and kind. This inability, 
produced by a heavy reliance on ana-
logy and metaphor to merely indicate 
geography, classify fetishes, or catalog 
habituation, befuddles all attempts to 
understand the socio-behavioral and 
1 Geertz (1973) described culture as “a system 
of inherited conceptions expressed in symbo-
lic forms by means of which men communica-
te, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge 
about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89).
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psycho-emotional significance of the 
active and preeminent role that culture 
plays in determining processes of behavior, 
identity and group interaction. So beyond 
being endowed with significant meaning, 
little is known about why cultural objects 
are indeed “cultural”. Consequently, the 
noble purpose of human aggregation 
is reduced to the truck and barter of 
accumulated symbols that degree, kind, 
and temporality envalue, but empties of 
their historical conscience, meaning, and 
collective personality. 
This article intends a more systematic 
presentation of culture, which it broadly 
defines as a dynamic, idiosyncratic model 
for human development; one whose logi-
cal arrangement of interpretative “deep 
structural” cosmological and ontological 
axioms of existence for collective orga-
nization and functioning configures the 
scope and nature of overt social behaviors 
and praxes (including symbols, language, 
customs) and informs a general plan for 
living that guides individual behavior 
and group praxes. This treatment of 
culture allows for a richer elaboration 
of it by clarifying its theological, philo-
sophical and scientific foundations and 
influences on its nature and role in the 
formation, organization and functioning 
of human aggregates. In addition, it offers 
a theoretical examination of the impli-
cations for social stability of antithetical 
deep structural axioms that disintegrate 
the teleology of indigenous existence into 
meaningless cultural symbols and rituals 
ripe for commodification. And, through it, 
the contemporary phenomenon of globa-
lization -- and the neoclassical paradigm 
that grounds it -- is found to engender 
an idiosyncratic, market-based model of 
reality and for living that are neither com-
monly shared human conceptualizations 
nor desired pursuits. 
Emergent Behavioralism
Contemporary social science treatments of 
culture as an analytical construct presents 
several problems of conceptualization that 
are readily apparent in the multiplicity of 
definitions for it. Anthropologically, cul-
ture is that complex whole of capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society (Tylor, 1871). As an ascriptive 
basis for a variety of civilizational forms, 
culture becomes organized behavior lear-
ned from a social group either through 
training or by imitation (Jackson, 1993, 
p. 170); the learned repertoire of every 
transmissible thought and action (Benton, 
1982). A more psychological treatment 
models culture as patterned meanings 
and conceptions historically transmit-
ted and expressed through symbols that 
communicate, develop and perpetuate 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life 
(Geertz, 1973), as a social product formed 
through externalization, objectification, 
and internalization (Berger, 1969), or 
simply as “the expressive side of human 
life” (Griswold, 1994). Conceptualizations 
of culture shaped by more praxeological 
considerations depict it as shared unders-
tandings that people employ to coordinate 
their activities (Becker, 1986).
Williams (1982) points out that culture 
ranges conceptually from an emphasis 
on a noumenal “spirit” informing distinct 
ways of life, to distinctly discernible social 
processes. The sense of culture as the active 
cultivation of the mind similarly ranges 
from a “developed” state of mind to pro-
cesses of intellectual development and the 
means for such processes (e.g., the arts). 
For Williams, a contemporary notion of 
culture references the means of intellectual 
development that are contradistinct their 
anthropological and extended sociological 
interpretations as a total way of life. Presu-
mably, this contemporary understanding 
of culture results from the convergence 
of an 18th century philosophical focus on 
“informing spirit” that is most apparent 
in specific cultural activities (e.g., rituals), 
and a later 19th century behavioralist focus 
on a total social order consisting primarily 
of integrated social activities. Williams 
identifies these coincident perspectives of 
culture as idealist and materialist respecti-
vely. Griswold (1994) similarly notes this 
distinction, stating that this contemporary 
understanding of the meaning and sense 
of culture results from an 18th century 
humanities approach that privileges an 
opposition between culture and civili-
zation, and a 19th century social science 
behavioralist approach that emphasizes 
a more congruous relationship between 
the two.2 
2 Interestingly enough, the approach by each 
to culture differs only inasmuch as there are 
socially corroborating distinctions between 
culture as cosmogony (worldview) and cultu-
re as the formation, organization and produc-
tion of signifying systems. 
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As analytical units, culture and society 
originate in an 18th century intellectual 
curiosity over the structure and functioning 
of human aggregations and their post-
mediaeval transformations. In stark con-
trast to its contemporary treatment, culture 
evidenced no clear conceptualization by 
early social scientists beyond intimations 
of necessarily intricate ligatures that bind 
individuals to a social aggregate.3 Culture 
would elude formal discovery until its 
emergence from 19th century inquiries into 
historical and behavioral determinants of 
human configurations and their influence 
on the disintegration and eventual collapse 
of political and subsistence modalities 
endemic to mediaeval Europe. With the 
advent of mercantilism, later to mature into 
industrial capitalism, and neoteric percep-
tions of history as a human construction, 
inquiry into the determinants of societal 
growth and change held as its principal 
question the fate of “modern” society, its 
diversification as crucial for comprehen-
sion, moral and utilitarian objectives as 
key determinants of agency, and manifold 
analytical perspectives as essential for con-
solidating universal laws and particularistic 
investigations.4 Historical differentials in 
societal configuration and functioning 
would further frame perfunctory searches 
of human aggregations for superintendent 
3 For example, although both Durkheim and 
Tönnies identified culture as likeness, com-
mon beliefs and custom, common rituals and 
symbols, the former saw them evolving into 
powerful, natural forces of coordination and 
solidarity and the latter into defragmenting 
forces of social disunity and purposelessness.
4 See Ross, 1992. p. 9. 
principles of change, stability and growth.5 
While those impetuses responsible for 
mediaeval social transitions are certainly 
historical considerations of import, the fact 
that these transitions stemmed from exten-
sive reevaluations of heretofore inviolate 
cosmological and ontological notions that 
buttressed the seemingly auto-destructive 
nature of human aggregations appears 
the more significant consideration. Be-
cause human aggregations historically 
tend toward dissolution and collapse as 
its internal dynamics steer it away from 
the Platonic ideal, are there immutable 
natural laws to which they inhere that 
predispose this historical characteristic? Is 
this historical characteristic merely the ma-
levolent outcome of human agency subject 
to natural laws? How might knowledge 
of superintendent societal laws and their 
functioning be acquired, and what insights 
can it lend to obviating the historically 
inevitable? Eighteenth and nineteenth 
century pursuits of answers to these ques-
tions shaped and hewed out philosophical 
and theoretical frameworks that oriented 
and conditioned systematic explorations 
into societal dynamics and the extirpation 
of principles presumed to govern them.
From a post-feudal shift in cosmogony 
(worldview) away from mediaeval theo-
5 The transition from feudalism to modernity 
similarly piqued a coincident interest in the 
nature of morality as the conceptual basis for 
society shifted from an integrated aristocratic 
and sacerdotal class within human aggrega-
tions stratified by Divine predisposition, to 
a highly individuated collectivity of rational 
persons each self-possessed of natural rights, 
powers and potentialities. 
centrism and toward a human determi-
nism grounded in the anthropocentrism 
of revived classical humanism emerged 
the discovery of both social reality and 
society as “the extensive and most inclusive 
ground of human activity.” Ross observes 
that a largely Christian interpretation of 
the nature and functioning of God and the 
metaphysical world made a mediaeval 
understanding of history intelligible not 
in terms of autonomous human agency, 
but in terms of an ascending sequence of 
sacred events that man enacted.6 Presuma-
bly, human existence naturally devolves 
from “the ideal, rational forms” as human 
agency, being of supernal construction, 
manifested Nature’s predisposition for 
randomness. The paradigmatic shift away 
from this mediaeval perception of human 
aggregation and toward an understanding 
of history as a human construction prope-
lled forward by a continuous procession of 
qualitative human actions framed explo-
rations into the anthropocentric nature of 
social reality, the laws to which it adheres, 
and the relationship between atomistic 
behavior7, aggregate “particularisms”, 
and societal progress. Mediaeval cosmo-
logical assumptions that once supported 
a static, ordinal hierarchy of human exis-
tence so ordered by Divine Providence 
would eventually be invested with the 
6 Ross (1991) further notes that the mediaeval 
view of history, along with a residual ancient 
idealism, limited understanding historical 
change. 
7 To be understood as social agency informed 
by what Ross (1991) terms the civic huma-
nism ideal wherein humans realize their full 
potential through political activity or partici-
pation. 
19
ENCUENTROS
spatial-temporal dynamism of Lamarckian 
evolutionary differentiation. With the old 
covenant “God” conceptually expunged 
from chaotic and capricious Nature, human 
aggregations would assume an orderliness 
and predictability so imposed by historicist 
and scientific approaches to understanding 
temporal and cross-national variations 
in civilization that redefine aggregations 
in terms of secularized human existence 
subject to the vicissitudes of an autono-
mous physical environment. Through 
these post-mediaeval interpretations of 
reality, differentials across human ag-
gregates would reveal dissimilarities in 
environmental circumstance and adaptive 
behavioral responses varied by indigenous 
ontological perceptions of a collective des-
tiny that a residual mediaeval cosmogony 
would persist to influence. Trepidation 
over a presumed inherent propensity for 
internal dissolution into barbarism or moral 
decay8 further influenced perfunctory 
examinations of human aggregation, 
binding them to coincident interests 
8 Ross (1991) notes that 18th century liberalism 
is alleged to have created a social and moral 
fragmentation that produced political chaos, 
social disorganization, and labor exploita-
tion by allowing a condition for deviation 
from the traditional conception of social or-
der. The social aggregate either functions or 
dysfunctions in accordance with “morality”, 
which pertains to atomistic behaviors and 
their congruence with the prevailing interpre-
tations of reality. This would later provide a 
basis for nominalist (rational) – realist (phy-
siocratic, organicist) distinctions in episte-
mological and methodological approaches 
to social inquiry, as well as a preoccupation 
by some early American sociologists (viz., 
Albion Small, Lester Ward, et.al.) with social 
control. 
in the nature of morality and its role in 
historical determinism.
Variations in historical terms used to 
denote significant relational configura-
tions evidence distinctions predicated 
upon differentials among classes of social 
interaction. Thus, linguistically, Greek 
and Latin perceptions of significant con-
figurations within human aggregates 
differentiated social interactions between 
free and bound persons. Christians even-
tually came to be included in widened 
Roman and medieval conceptualizations 
of significant relational configurations 
which ironically neglected distinguishing 
between “society” and “state”. German 
gesellschaft, Dutch maatschappij and English 
society further widened more extensive 
and more inclusive conceptualizations 
of significant relational configurations as 
they were contemporaneous vernacular 
terms initially denoting spatially confined 
relational interactions. The notion of so-
ciety evolved from a mere adumbrated 
“sphere” existing side by side traditional 
aristocratic and sacerdotal formations so 
stratified and fated by Divine predisposi-
tion to elucidate an aggregation of highly 
individuated rational agents self-posses-
sed of natural rights, powers and poten-
tialities. Concomitant this conceptual 
refinement was an emergent conflation, 
both in correspondence and affectation, of 
its significance for evaluating civilizational 
progress with the behavioral import of the 
relational ligatures that bind individual 
rational agents to the functioning of the 
human aggregation. By the 19th century, 
hierarchical mediaeval distinctions in 
relational interactions would persist to 
moor internecine struggles for status and 
power between aristocratic and bourgeoi-
sie social formations to both an emergent 
nation-state structure and a cosmogony 
of material evolution. Upon the advent 
of the French and German revolutions, 
the notion of society would acquire an 
egalitarian significance befitting the his-
torical transformations in European social 
configurations from exclusivist state-estate 
relations to free and equal associations 
of men unfettered by endowments of 
nobility.
Explanations of mediaeval social transi-
tions into “modernity” necessitated the 
emergence of an analytical construct for 
understanding and evaluating the civi-
lizational legitimacy of human aggrega-
tions that was conceptually grounded in 
patterned societal phenomena. Arguably, 
post-feudal reconstructions of mediaeval 
cosmological and ontological perceptions 
of human existence invested transitions 
of contemporaneous aggregations with 
“modern” ideas about his environment, 
his behavior as it is conditioned by that 
environment, and the impetus for such 
behavior. The notion of society would 
come to be conditioned by this cosmo-
logical shift in apprehending the envi-
ronmental context in which processes of 
human aggregation occur; one that would 
later substantiate a realist-organicist 
theoretical approach to explanations of 
their associative and functional patterns 
of bio-social subsistence. Moreover, the 
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ontological re-discovery of humanism 
and its substantiation of a nominalist 
theoretical approach to associative and 
functional impetuses would further con-
dition the conceptual contours of society 
as relational configurations that fulfill the 
basic biosocial needs of the aggregation.
social science usage 
Social science examinations of society, 
its problems and their basis in culture 
typically employ a behavioralist approach 
to explain a presumed mutual affecta-
tion between atomistic behaviors and 
aggregate organization and functioning. 
The utility of culture for social science 
research seemingly rests with its sig-
nificance to the nominalist variant of a 
positivist methodological locus from 19th 
century discourse on “modern” society. 
As an analytical framework, behavio-
rism provides a nominalist perspective 
to understanding the shared subjective 
meanings that people use to coordinate 
and integrate their social interactions, 
and to interpreting culture’s array of ge-
neral provisions for and overall function 
within human aggregations. Thus, its 
explanatory efficacy for the relationship 
between culture and society stems from 
the intellectual disputes over cosmological 
and ontological assumptions underlying 
various conceptualizations of society that 
conditioned methodological distinctions 
in investigations of societal change. 
Conceptually grounded in post-medieval 
physiocracy, influenced by the neo-He-
gelianism of Wundt, Dilthey and Dewey, 
social behaviorism views behavior as 
a system of purposive, intersubjective 
actions whose integration of sensory 
and motor functions enables human 
adaptation to environment. Society as 
human aggregation is presumed to be 
sui generis: antedating the individual, 
originating his self-perception, and sha-
ping his overt social behavior to fit its 
preexisting organization and functioning. 
What appears to be the distinguishing 
criterion is the kind or type of mea-
ning a cultural object possesses – the 
motivations for human behavior – in 
the context of aggregate human beha-
vior. Marx, for example, is described 
as originating cultural meaning in the 
antagonistic patterns of social interaction 
that arise from productive, allocative 
or consumptive adaptations to austere 
material conditions. As a constituent 
part of the superstructure, culture exerts 
a hegemonic influence upon dynamic 
social class interests and antagonisms 
through material contradictions inherent 
man’s relationship to his parsimonious 
environment, and the contrived social 
contradictions inherent his attempts to 
organize his socioeconomic behavior 
thereupon. Contrastly, institutionalists 
focus on the ability of social structure to 
meet societal needs through its functio-
nal interdependencies and teleology. 
Again, social conflict constructs cultural 
meanings that evidence the degree to 
which institutions efficaciously satiate 
objective social needs. Here, societal 
needs are quite protean and fungible. 
Being without an identified, consensual 
permanence, societal needs can dramati-
cally shift over time in impetus, purpose 
or catalyst. The immediate effect of such 
shifts on the relevant institution’s ability 
to adequately meet the newly formed 
needs is systemic functional dysteleology. 
Occluded social interactions, in the long 
run, would produce a diseconomies of 
scale until equilibrating adjustments 
in social relations take effect (e.g., new 
policies or legislation).
Inexplicably, the use of behavioralist ap-
proaches to research on society preterits 
an account of the origin, structure and 
substance of what Williams (1982) terms 
the ideological component of culture and 
its interpretative affectation on orde-
ring the human experience. As a result, 
behaviorism begs significant questions 
about associations between its implicit 
assumptions about the distinctive nature 
of human being and their affective role 
in shaping, coordinating and integrating 
social interactions; momentous questions 
whose import extends well beyond dis-
cursive disagreements over causality. 
What requires clearer explanation is the 
symbolic model through which social 
agents are able to come to terms with 
their environment: to understand it, to 
see it, and to interpret it.9 That symbolic 
model identified by Williams (1982) as 
the ideological component of culture that 
interprets and orders the human expe-
rience, and by Geertz (1973) as accumu-
lated, organized significant symbols that 
9    See Benton, 1982.
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impose meaning, function as behavioral 
controls to social agency, and construct a 
constant orientation which circumscribes 
social utility and rationality. 
cultural Deep structure 
A more holistically consideration of cul-
ture lies beyond its behaviorist treatment: 
one that considers the structure and 
functioning of ethnic cognitive modali-
ties, personality constructs and world-
views within qualitatively differentiated 
environments.10 This fuller treatment po-
sits a psycho-behavioral association bet-
ween several distinct yet interdependent 
levels of perception whose interaction 
produces a dynamic cybernetic process 
of situating oneself within an environ-
mental space. Its conceptual refinement 
of the philosophical underpinnings of 
culture renders it a scientific construct 
that Azibo (1992) broadly characterizes 
as a process which gives a people a ge-
neral design for living and patterns for 
interpreting reality. 
As a process, various constituent elements 
interact at and between two levels of culture 
to provide for a functional order within 
its overall interpretive design. A primary 
level cosmogony structures the forma-
tion of a secondary level set of axioms 
of existence, through which emerge a 
system for conducting life that pattern or 
10 That is, socially oppressive environments. 
See Azibo, 1992; Baldwin, 1980; Akbar, 1976, 
1991a; Nobles, 1976, 1991a, l991b; Dixon, 
1976; Fanon, 2005, 2008; King, 1976. 
“models” an idiosyncratic social reality. 
This interpretive model provides a moral 
structure that governs social behavior 
and praxes. Combined, these primary 
and secondary levels of culture comprise 
“cultural deep structure” -- a logistical 
arrangement of interpretative axioms of 
existence grounded in the cosmological 
and ontological orientations.11 Cultural 
deep structure organizes the scope and 
nature of the tertiary level of culture, 
which is constituted by a vast array of 
overt, manifest behaviors and practices, 
inclusive of symbols, language and pat-
terned social behaviors. The objective 
functioning of culture’s deep structure is 
to organize and reproduce social reality 
for the members of the social aggregate.
This conceptualization of culture deli-
neates a universal human propensity to 
construct symbolic paradigms that function 
both as worldview-specific models for 
living, harboring a metaphysical inter-
pretation of reality, and ethos-specific 
models for reality that prescribe moral 
or evaluative standards for social be-
havior. Once understood in this way, 
culture can then boast a logistical arran-
gement of interpretative axioms of human 
existence grounded in the cosmological 
and ontological orientations of “deep 
structure” that organizes the scope and 
nature of manifest social behaviors and 
praxes. It becomes a process of human 
development. Its deep structural axioms 
superintend the functional organization 
and reproduction of a human aggregate, 
11 See Nobles, 1976, 1991a, l991b. 
and the social conditions (cum: environ-
ment) that cultivate human develop-
ment – however idiosyncratically defined. 
This set of cosmological and ontological 
axioms, as the basis of culture, hews out 
that distinctive axiological and beha-
vioral orientation posited by Geertz, et. 
al. Philosophical conceptualizations of 
the origin, structure and mechanics of 
the universe as environment buttress 
a collective self-conceptualization that 
confers both purpose and direction to 
human existence. Through this conflation 
of perceived environmental relationships, 
both physical and metaphysical, emerges 
a set of norming behavioral parameters 
that are simultaneously prescriptive and 
morally evaluative of social conduct to 
the extent that they are cosmologically 
and ontologically consistent. 
Thus, the deep structure of culture’s deep 
structure informs Benton’s collection of 
observable behavioral repertoires that 
signify philosophical orientations and 
social valuations. Culture itself models 
an idiosyncratic horizontal and verti-
cal progression of human existence in 
purpose and function across layers of 
perceived reality.12 Overt social behaviors 
and the institutionalized patterns of social 
relationships and interactions combine 
to constitute a culturally idiosyncratic 
model for human development propa-
gated by myriad agents of socialization. 
Socialization itself necessarily involves 
12 See Akbar, 1976, 1991; Ani, 1994; Benton, 
1982; Mbiti, 1970; Nobles, 1991a, 1991b; Stans-
field, 1982. 
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participatory processes of enculturation 
that entrench and sustain society mem-
bers through phased human develop-
ment by prescribing social behaviors, 
responsibilities and obligations within 
the parameter of an idiosyncratic concep-
tualization of human existence rooted in 
the culture’s axiological set. Behavior or 
conduct becomes “rational” to the extent 
that it is cosmologically and ontologically 
consistent. Social institutions as habi-
tualized behavioral patterns actualize 
this axiological set by transforming its 
cosmological and ontological axioms 
into ordered societal praxes that at once 
communicate, reinforce and propagate 
their interpretations of physical and me-
taphysical realities. Upon this, culture can 
now be regarded as a cybernetic process 
of human development wherein shared 
cosmological perceptions and indivi-
duated ontological references comprise 
an axiological set that structures social 
agency within a specified social space. 
Post-Industrial Axiological sets
Accordingly, the unique problem posed 
for non-Western peoples by studies of their 
social dilemmas is the former’s inherent 
need for behavioral consistency between 
cultural deep structure and adapted so-
cioeconomic praxes should habituated 
patterns of purposive social interaction 
avoid falling into dysfunction.13  However, 
western social science has and continues 
13  See Diop, 1991, p. 129ff. Later, Stewart (1992) 
would deal with this very issue with regard to 
a strict study of African Americans. 
to provide the analytical approaches, fra-
meworks and models that obfuscate the 
significance of cultural deep structure to 
evolving social problems in a highly glo-
balized world. These models raise serious 
questions about linkages between social 
science inquiries and the emergent crises 
in societal organization and functioning 
among non-Western peoples – crises fue-
led by inherited but disparate axiological 
sets that support socially non-productive 
behavioral repertoires.14  
The fact that both colonialism and neo-
colonialism superimposed alien axiolo-
gical sets in need of appropriate social 
behaviors begs the question: Can a strictly 
Western axiological set support existing 
non-Western behavioral repertoires that 
sustain an idiosyncratic cultural percep-
tion of social environment? Economic 
agency within non-Western communities, 
for example, the local reinforces an obli-
gatory integrity between deep structural 
axiology such that an unproductive sub-
sistence modality necessarily evidences 
an inurement of alien cosmology and 
ontology perceptions that subvert if not 
displace praxes known to be ethnically-
religious based. Beneath national efforts 
at democratization, privatization, civic 
engagement and social reform lay an 
antipodal cultural model of reality that 
prescribes material want-satiation, material 
accumulation, and psychological objecti-
fication as moral - evaluative criteria for 
behaviors whose rationality obtains only 
within Western social organization. With 
14 See Stewart, 1992. 
culture perceived as materially determi-
ned15, such efforts moor non-Western 
economic agency to simple subsistence 
behaviors appearing capable of satisfying 
only the most basic bio-social needs. Their 
utilitarian root divests local behavior of 
its socio-religious axiological set, thereby 
misdirecting its balanced satiation of three-
dimensional bio-social need to privilege 
only the material. Hedonism supplants 
deep structural spiritual impetus for moral 
conduct.16 The use of Western rational 
choice criteria to support and reproduce 
the socio-religious foundation of indige-
nous society generates meta-axiological 
dilemma over appropriate micro-level 
behaviors and their contribution to so-
cietal needs.17 Meta-axiological dilemma 
encourages sustained underdevelopment 
as local economic agency acquires new 
attitudes, social behaviors and moral obli-
gations but no adequate resources with 
which to satisfy their material ends. Con-
sequently, conflict over scarce resources 
necessarily ensues, and, in locations such 
as Northern Nigeria, consumerism as the 
behavioral manifestation of materialism 
necessitates eruptions of violence.
Questions of linkage focus specifically on 
the disjunction between models of social 
organization and functioning among 
15 Not in the sense of a philosophical orientation 
which suggests that material existence defi-
nes man’s purpose and thereby informs cul-
ture. Rather, in the sense of a psychological 
belief that there exists physical objects readily 
available for individual possession. 
16 See Bentham, Jeremy ([1776] 1988), especially 
chapters 1 - 5. 
17 See ibn-Hyman, 1997.
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non-Western peoples as a subset of Wes-
tern knowledge, as a self-contained and 
distinct body of knowledge, and, as a 
combination of existing disciplines. This 
disjunction indicates a lack of clarity in 
delineating the cultural scope and nature 
of the social phenomenon to be studied, 
and the implications of this lack of clarity 
for social scientific perspectives and ap-
proaches that seek to assess comparative 
proximity to Western social processes. 
The object of disciplinary inquiry must 
be clearly specified in order to unders-
tand the full conceptual significance of 
culture to the primary models within the 
field and any disjunction between them. 
Accordingly, and for the purpose of this 
paper, this object of analysis is specified 
as the global African social aggregation. 
This specification renders the social phe-
nomenon for social science inquiry con-
ceptually inclusive. Moreover, it holds 
variations in life experiences typically 
imputed environmental and circumstan-
tial differentials conceptually constant as 
distinctions of degree, not of kind. While 
social oppression and inequality did his-
torically shape African social aggregates 
in different geographical locations to 
varying degrees, the common effect of 
these shared exogenous influences was 
reformations of social praxes. It is upon 
this that the significance of culture as a 
process of human development for social 
science models must be carefully conside-
red and permitted to superintend serious 
scholarly inquiries into the conceptual 
organization of social organization and 
functioning among African peoples. 
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